Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement: Beijing's Broken Promises by Davis, MC
Title Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement: Beijing's Broken Promises
Author(s) Davis, MC
Citation Journal of Democracy, 2015, v. 26 n. 2, p. 101-110
Issued Date 2015
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/209728
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2595643 
April 2015, Volume 26, Number 2  $14.00
The Authoritarian Resurgence
Lilia Shevtsova on Russia     Javier Corrales on Venezuela
Abbas Milani/Alex Vatanka on Iran     Frederic Wehrey on Saudi Arabia
Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement
Michael C. Davis     Victoria Tin-bor Hui
The Freedom House Survey for 2014
Arch Puddington
Zoltan Barany on Transitions from Military Rule
Yun-han Chu & Bridget Welsh on East Asia’s Millennials
Elisabete Azevedo-Harman on Mozambique
Pierre Englebert on Zimbabwe
Harley Balzer on Vladimir Putin
Transitional Justice and Its Discontents
Duncan McCargo
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2595643 
Beijing’s Broken Promises
Michael C. Davis
Michael C. Davis is professor of law at the University of Hong Kong. 
He has held visiting chairs in human rights at Northwestern University 
and Notre Dame, as well as the Schell Senior Fellowship in Human 
Rights at Yale Law School. He publishes widely on human rights and 
constitutionalism.
For almost three months beginning in late September 2014, the people 
of Hong Kong filled the streets of their city and made world headlines 
with a dramatic series of large, peaceful protests that became known 
as the Umbrella Movement. The protests’ spark was a decision by the 
Standing Committee of China’s legislature (the National People’s Con-
gress or NPC) in Beijing to renege on promised reforms meant to expand 
political participation in the former colony, which Britain had returned 
to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1997 under what Beijing had 
declared would be a “one country, two systems” approach enshrined in 
Hong Kong’s Basic Law. 
At bottom, the protesters’ message was simple: Beijing had failed to 
fulfill key commitments under both the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declara-
tion and the Basic Law.1 This failure can be seen not only in the NPC 
Standing Committee’s decision to reject genuine universal suffrage, but 
also in Beijing’s recent cabinet White Paper on how the “one country, 
two systems” concept is now to be applied to the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR). According to the White Paper:
China’s central government has comprehensive jurisdiction over all local 
administrative regions, including the HKSAR. The high degree of autonomy 
of HKSAR is not an inherent power, but one that comes solely from the 
authorization by the central leadership. The high degree of autonomy of the 
HKSAR is not full autonomy, nor a decentralized power. It is the power to 
run local affairs as authorized by the central leadership.2 
By going back on the promise of universal suffrage, the White Paper 
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and the NPC decision undermine critical foundations of the rule of law 
upon which Hong Kong’s survival as a distinct legal system has long 
depended. These actions have made 
it increasingly difficult for Hong 
Kong people and the international 
community to take Beijing’s com-
mitments at face value. 
The Joint Declaration aimed to 
carry out the “one country, two sys-
tems” policy, which was originally 
outlined in Article 31 of the PRC’s 
1982 Constitution. The Declaration 
was the product of several difficult 
years of Sino-British negotiations 
in the early 1980s. These talks fol-
lowed on the heels of PRC leader 
Deng Xiaoping’s famous 1979 
statement that those investing in (or thinking of investing in) the boom-
ing commercial and industrial metropolis of Hong Kong should “put 
their hearts at ease.”3 
Amid the give-and-take of the negotiations, Deng had come to grasp 
that the preservation of Hong Kong’s distinctive capitalist system—and 
hence its ability to boost China’s economic development—would de-
pend on a rocklike commitment to the “one country, two systems” mod-
el. That model, in turn, aimed to protect Hong Kong from the intrusion 
of China’s socialist system. The PRC was then in the early stages of re-
form after the chaos of the 1960s and 1970s, years of turbulence that had 
culminated in a high-level power struggle following the death of Mao 
Zedong in 1976. Deng’s aim was for Hong Kong to be returned to China 
in a way that would preserve prosperity and social order and enable the 
city’s remarkably industrious and enterprising people to contribute to 
China’s modernization and economic development. He no doubt hoped 
that this respectful, arms-length approach would kindle Hong Kong’s 
loyalty in return. 
In order to work, the model had to win the confidence of Hong Kong’s 
people. The city’s liberal, free-spirited, capitalistic populace was not 
going to be reassured by mere pronouncements from a regime that many 
of them justifiably distrusted. Similarly, the international acceptance 
needed for foreign governments and enterprises to treat Hong Kong as a 
distinct entity in their financial and commercial dealings would require 
more than vague promises.
The way to bridge this confidence gap, Beijing decided, was to em-
bed the “one country, two systems” model in an international treaty. 
This is the Joint Declaration, which was duly registered as a treaty with 
the United Nations. It was presented in Hong Kong and world capitals 
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alike with repeated assurances that hearts could rest at ease about the 
city’s future. The agreement stipulated (Article 3, Section 12) that its 
content was to be included in the Hong Kong Basic Law, which thus 
became a product of the Joint Declaration and hence a matter of solemn 
international-treaty obligations. 
The Declaration guarantees Hong Kong a “high degree of autonomy, 
except in foreign and defense affairs.” Promises of democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law are spelled out at a length designed to leave 
no doubt about a basic commitment to keeping Hong Kong an open 
society. Regarding democracy, the Declaration stipulates that the future 
Hong Kong chief executive is to be chosen by “elections or consulta-
tions to be held locally,” with the city’s future legislature to be chosen 
“by elections.” 
The treaty makes clear the liberal nature of the human rights to be 
protected. It lists about sixteen basic rights, fully half of which relate to 
freedom of speech. These include press freedom, labor rights, academic 
research, and so on. Annex I requires continued application to Hong 
Kong of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (IC-
CPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR). The ICCPR would become the source for the text 
of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, which has been incorporated into the 
Basic Law by way of its Article 39, as Hong Kong courts have applied 
it since the 1997 handover.
According to Hong Kong opinion surveys, this structure’s most im-
portant plank is the guarantee to maintain the city’s existing common-
law legal system and its associated rule of law. The Joint Declaration 
provides that existing laws—including the common law, rules of equity, 
local ordinances, and customary law—are to be maintained. The courts 
are to be independent, with the highest court of final appeal remaining 
in Hong Kong, whose people retain the right to challenge in court any 
public official believed to have violated the Basic Law. The Declaration 
calls for the inclusion of all these commitments in the Basic Law. 
These various requirements in the Joint Declaration combined to lay 
a foundation for robust constitutionalism that has served Hong Kong 
well. After the handover, Hong Kong courts quickly came to understand 
that the Basic Law’s supremacy under this model justified the exercise 
of that most important power of modern constitutional practice: consti-
tutional judicial review. This gives courts the power to say whether of-
ficial acts are constitutional or not, and has generally proven worldwide 
to be the best foundation for safeguarding human rights and the rule of 
law under a written constitution. Hong Kong’s established common-law 
tradition offers the best guarantee that its courts will use this power 
without fear or favor, in a manner that is fair and independent. 
In Hong Kong and the world at large, the solemn commitments en-
shrined in this international agreement were taken quite seriously. The 
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flow of emigrants leaving the city began to drop, and opinions about 
its future became more optimistic. Given what things had been like in 
China—and let us recall that even today the PRC lacks the Special Ad-
ministrative Region’s level of constitutional development—Hong Kong 
people would never have put their hearts “at ease” based on some vague 
Beijing promises without the backing of an international agreement. 
Beijing officials made many trips to sell the “one country, two systems” 
model abroad, giving Hong Kong people even more grounds for having 
confidence in it.
It is surely the case that Hong Kong has done its part, as the Joint Dec-
laration envisioned it would, to aid China’s economic development and 
modernization. As one of the world’s leading educational, financial, com-
mercial, and cultural centers, it is a gigantic asset to the PRC. The catch 
is that Hong Kong will only remain so if the central government can be 
restrained from its natural tendency to intrude upon the city’s autonomy. 
The Hong Kong Basic Law
The Basic Law should be an important means of ensuring that re-
straint, but it has some flaws. Particular shortcomings have to do with 
the independence and finality of the courts and the election and powers 
of the legislature. These shortcomings have contributed to the current 
impasse between the Umbrella Movement on the one hand, and the Bei-
jing and Hong Kong authorities and their allies on the other. The limits 
placed on the courts and legislature of Hong Kong have opened the way 
to mainland interference in local affairs and fed growing public worry 
that cronyism and influence-peddling are creeping across the border. 
Other problems have come with this. Local-government initiatives (es-
pecially those undertaken with encouragement from Beijing) often run 
into public protests and have to be withdrawn, making Hong Kong look 
less governable.
The ultimate power to interpret the Basic Law rests with the NPC 
Standing Committee in Beijing, advised by a Basic Law Committee. 
The decisions of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) are re-
spected in the narrow sense that its judgments are final and binding with 
respect to the parties in the immediate case at hand. In one famous 1999 
case (dealing with the “right to abode”), the NPC Standing Committee 
let the Hong Kong government, absent any authorizing language in the 
Basic Law, do an end run around the CFA by asking the Standing Com-
mittee to overturn the ruling as legal precedent.4 This end-run poten-
tial has roused public concern. The Standing Committee is required to 
consult the NPC’s Basic Law Committee in such cases, but the process 
is opaque. Until the issuance of the 2014 White Paper, the Standing 
Committee and the Hong Kong authorities kept public concerns under 
control by being slow to use such extraordinary powers. 
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The Basic Law has a bigger shortcoming that involves democratic 
elections—or more accurately, their lack. Every one of Hong Kong’s 
three chief executives since 1997 has been selected—the process falls 
under the Joint Declaration’s category of “consultation”—by an Elec-
tion Committee5 that represents mostly elites. Similarly, the 70-member 
Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) has nearly half its seats filled 
by narrow “functional constituencies” that often vote in a corporate 
fashion with no meaningful electoral competition involved. To Beijing’s 
credit, the Basic Law makes explicit what is implicit via the incorpora-
tion of the ICCPR: The “ultimate aim” is the adoption of “universal 
suffrage” in electing both the legislature and the chief executive. The 
failure to keep that commitment is what drives the Umbrella Movement 
and the current controversy.
The meaning of universal suffrage should be clear. The term gener-
ally implies free and fair elections with the rights to vote and to run for 
office. Article 39 of the Basic Law provides that “the rights and free-
doms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents” shall not be restricted in any 
way that contravenes the ICCPR as applied in Hong Kong.6 Turning to 
the ICCPR, we read in its Article 25: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without the distinc-
tions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions. . . . 
to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage . . . guaranteeing the free expression of the 
will of the voters.
The General Comment on Article 25 issued by the ICCPR Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) emphasizes that universal suffrage should en-
able the voters to have a genuine choice in a free and fair election.7 Article 
2 of the ICCPR bars discrimination based on (among other things) politi-
cal opinion. Offering further assurances, Basic Law Article 26 guarantees 
Hong Kong residents “the right to vote and the right to stand for election 
in accordance with law.” Such law includes Basic Law guarantees of free-
dom of expression and equality. 
And yet when it comes to democratic reform in Hong Kong, the NPC 
Standing Committee has continually dragged its feet. In a 2004 interpre-
tation that overstepped the Basic Law’s amendment process, the NPC 
Standing Committee added a requirement for the Hong Kong govern-
ment to submit for Standing Committee approval a report indicating that 
there is a need to change the method of electing either LegCo or the chief 
executive.8 Although the Basic Law specifies that the NPC Standing 
Committee must give its approval before there can be any change in the 
method of electing the chief executive, changes in LegCo election rules 
require only a report “for the record.”9 Under the 2004 interpretation, 
however, Beijing’s approval is required in advance for either reform. 
In 2007, with a LegCo election coming up in 2008, the NPC Stand-
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ing Committee decided not to increase the ratio of directly elected to 
functional-constituency seats. The Committee did rule, however, that 
a) “universal suffrage” would be allowed for the 2017 vote to choose a 
chief executive, and b) that if the 2017 election for chief executive went 
forward under universal suffrage, then the next LegCo election, set for 
2020, could be by universal suffrage as well.10 Although the advance-
approval requirement that had been set up in 2004 would still apply, 
even the very skeptical Hong Kong public felt its hopes rising.
The 2007 decision touched off a debate about what “universal suf-
frage” should mean in the context of choosing a chief executive. Basic 
Law Article 45 states as its “ultimate aim” the “selection of the Chief 
Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly repre-
sentative nominating committee in accordance with democratic proce-
dures.” But after years of delay, Hong Kong people had become suspi-
cious regarding Beijing’s democratic promises. 
In its 2007 decision, the NPC Standing Committee said that the “nom-
inating committee” referred to in Article 45 “may be formed with refer-
ence” to the current Election Committee—a body that is well known 
for heavily favoring candidates from Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing estab-
lishment. It has historically nominated few prodemocracy candidates 
despite the low threshold (support from one-eighth of all Committee 
members) that is required. The suspicion stirred by the idea of using the 
Election Committee as a model was thus considerable. What would keep 
Beijing from manipulating the makeup of the new Nominating Commit-
tee just as it had long done with the Election Committee? As a hedge 
against this prospect, Hong Kong democrats began backing proposals 
for making public or civil nominations (that is, nominations first by 
the voters at large or by a political party) binding on the Nominating 
Committee. Beijing officials have attacked these proposals as violating 
the Basic Law, an ironic charge given that even if it is true, their own 
restrictions have violated that law more profoundly still.
Worries Come to a Head
The debate about universal suffrage in the 2017 chief-executive race 
got off to a raucous start. Wary of more foot-dragging and efforts to 
manipulate the public-consultation process set for January to May 2014, 
a prodemocracy group calling itself Occupy Central for Love and Peace 
warned that the adoption of any electoral model failing to meet interna-
tional standards for freedom and fairness would spark a civil-disobedi-
ence campaign. In order to dramatize the situation and reveal the state 
of public sentiment, Occupy Central organized a late-June civic refer-
endum that drew nearly 800,000 voters. This turnout—about a ninth of 
Hong Kong’s 7.2 million people—highlighted the level of public con-
tempt for the just-published White Paper. In the minds of Hong Kong 
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people, there is a strong link that joins democracy to the city’s autonomy 
and ability to maintain the rule of law. The White Paper threatened all 
three. Soon after the referendum, a half-million marchers showed up for 
the annual July 1 democracy march. The pro-Beijing camp responded 
with an “anti-Occupy” march. 
Lines had now been drawn. In the White Paper, Beijing had declared 
itself the boss, with little said about putting hearts at ease. The Joint 
Declaration’s twelve articles had become twelve preexisting Chinese 
principles that “come solely from the authorization of the central leader-
ship,” with little said about the international legal commitments that the 
Declaration entails.11 As if to clear up any doubt about Beijing’s stance, 
Chinese diplomats and Foreign Ministry officials would before the end 
of 2014 begin openly claiming that the 1997 handover had completely 
fulfilled the Joint Declaration and thereby rendered it “void.”12 Such 
claims, of course, fly in the face of clear language in the Joint Declara-
tion’s Article 7 that obligates both parties to implement all articles of the 
agreement. By undercutting the Joint Declaration, Beijing emphasized 
the NPC Standing Committee’s full authority to interpret or amend the 
Basic Law as it chooses. It would subsequently use such authority to 
interpret “universal suffrage” in its own idiosyncratic way.
The White Paper calls the view that takes Hong Kong’s high degree of 
autonomy seriously “confused or lopsided.” A “high degree of autonomy” 
is said not to be “full autonomy”; the central government’s “comprehen-
sive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong is likened to its direct control over 
other local administrative regions; and the NPC Standing Committee is 
credited with not only “comprehensive jurisdiction” but also the power 
of “supervision” over local legislation.13 The White Paper paradoxically 
identifies the NPC Standing Committee as the guardian of Hong Kong’s 
rule of law, with Hong Kong judges described as administrative or gov-
erning officials charged with upholding national security. The decidedly 
unrepresentative Election Committee is described as “an expression of 
equal representation and broad representativeness.” The White Paper 
even says that the chief executive must be a person “who loves the coun-
try and loves Hong Kong,” a phrase that is seen in Hong Kong as code for 
“must be a figure in tune with the pro-Beijing establishment.”
Meanwhile, two documents put out by Hong Kong’s local government 
officially started the democratic-reform process. The first summarized 
five months of consultations regarding electoral reform. The second was 
the HKSAR chief executive’s report to the NPC Standing Committee on 
the need for reform.14 Together, these papers put forward the misleading 
claim that “mainstream opinion” (or “relatively more views”) favored 
the outcomes that Beijing had called for (and would later require) on 
issues such as the patriotism of the chief executive and the Nominating 
Committee’s makeup, procedures, and powers. Scrutiny later revealed 
that more than nine-tenths of the material conveyed in the consulta-
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tion report consisted of en bloc submissions by elements aligned with 
the government.15 In January 2015 came first a report on the Umbrella 
Movement protests and then the launch of the second round of dem-
ocratic-reform consultations. Nowhere 
has there been any attempt to correct 
the earlier misrepresentations of Hong 
Kong opinion or to address public con-
cerns in a serious way.16
The NPC Standing Committee em-
braced the chief executive’s report. 
Instead of the straight approval or 
disapproval specified in the 2004 in-
terpretation, the Standing Committee 
imposed severe restrictions along with 
its approval.17 A requirement to mod-
el the Nominating Committee on the 
Election Committee ensured that nominations will remain in the hands 
of unrepresentative and establishment-favoring elites. A 50 percent (as 
opposed to a 12.5 percent) threshold for nomination guaranteed that 
democratically minded candidates (known locally as “pan-democrats” 
to signify that they come from a range of parties and groups) would 
have no chance of getting through the door. As if to nail this down, there 
was also a requirement that the number of those nominated to be chief 
executive cannot exceed three. Like the White Paper, the decision wor-
ries about sovereignty and security, and stresses that the chief executive 
must love “the country” (that is, China) and Hong Kong. 
The democratically minded legislators who hold slightly more than 
a third of LegCo’s seats have vowed to boycott the second-round con-
sultation and block the final bill (which needs two-thirds to pass). Some 
scholars have floated models that they argue may permit nomination of 
a figure from the “pan-democratic” camp to become chief executive in 
2017, but nothing on offer seems sufficient to assure such a possibility, 
and it seems likely that Beijing would block the move anyway. Under 
the stringent guidelines that Beijing has imposed, compromise is doubt-
ful.
Beijing has abandoned commitments that are fundamental to the “one 
country, two systems” model. The shift in tone from “hearts at ease” to 
“comprehensive [central] jurisdiction” would be worrying enough even 
without the White Paper’s specific challenges to the Joint Declaration 
and the “one country, two systems” formula. The Declaration, for in-
stance, does not contemplate making Hong Kong’s courts subordinate 
to the NPC Standing Committee. Beijing’s move to recast a solemn in-
ternational treaty as a set of purely Chinese principles calls into ques-
tion the security of the “one country, two systems” formula and with it, 
the rule of law in Hong Kong. A state of things in which Hong Kong 
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is under direct central control similar to that which Beijing exerts over 
China’s other administrative regions cannot be consistent with the high 
degree of local autonomy that was once promised. 
Beijing’s purported “universal suffrage” has stripped the concept of 
all meaning. What kind of universal suffrage can exist when all opposi-
tion candidates are barred from an election? The Human Rights Com-
mittee that is charged with monitoring how states implement the ICCPR 
has already raised questions about Hong Kong’s democratic develop-
ment.18 By defending Beijing’s severe restrictions, Hong Kong’s local 
government has damaged its own credibility and cast a shadow across its 
own governance capacity as well as Hong Kong’s precious international 
reputation as a place of freedom.
With the complete lack of democratic progress, Hong Kong people 
are left with no way to voice their objections other than their free-speech 
right of resistance through public protest. Civil disobedience is general-
ly considered more justified in the face of a lack of democracy. Through 
its systematic interference and denial of democratic reform, Beijing has 
caused not less but more protest, thereby undermining its own desire for 
a more placid Hong Kong. 
A change in policy to meet in full the commitments enshrined in the 
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, as those commitments are com-
monly understood, is greatly needed. Allowing a thriving, self-govern-
ing Hong Kong to emerge will surely diminish confrontation and en-
gender the patriotism that China has long sought. The first step is for 
leading officials in Hong Kong and Beijing to stop blaming the people 
of Hong Kong, and instead to look in the mirror. Then it will become 
clear that the best way to rule Hong Kong is in accord with the genuine 
democratic commitments reflected in the Basic Law. The fake democ-
racy now on the table falls short of that standard. 
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